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Abstract: Over the last 20 years, developing countries have witnessed the 
increased role of non-governmental actors such as health industry associations 
and umbrella organizations in the diffusion and governance of health innova-
tion. Utilizing extensive interviews with actors in the Indian and South African 
health industries, this paper argues that, in a context of emerging pluralism 
– i.e., a dynamic context of bargaining between competing (public and private) 
interests and values – these associations constitute public actors that play dual 
roles in the politics of innovation and development. Specifically, not only do 
they engage downstream by diffusing knowledge to their respective health 
innovation systems in order to achieve common objectives, they also engage 
upstream with their governments to co-develop policies and regulations. This 
dual role of health industry associations and umbrella organizations makes 
them less neutral politically but more effective institutionally, and their innova-
tive and political role should be seriously taken into account in the healthcare 
sector.
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1  Introduction
Over the last 20 years, developing countries have witnessed the increased role of 
non-governmental actors in the diffusion and governance of health innovation 
such as industry associations and umbrella organizations – i.e., organizations 
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representing multi-sectoral industry firms and associations.1 The latter “is becom-
ing one of the driving forces behind economic development of developing coun-
tries and a vital tool for improving efficiency and accessibility of healthcare for the 
poor.”2 Several developing countries with powerful industry associations, includ-
ing India and South Africa, have made remarkable progress towards addressing 
local health needs through intensive research and development (R&D) and inno-
vative health products.3 This is significant, as pharmaceutical and biotech compa-
nies based in developed countries have tended not to produce drugs for exclusive 
use in the developing world, and instead, the role of domestic pharmaceutical and 
biotech companies as well as multinational health corporations with facilities in 
developing countries – i.e., the health industry – has filled this gap.
The rapid growth of health innovation in developing countries and the 
increased importance of health industry associations in influencing innovative 
performance require new thinking about the private and public institutions which 
diffuse and govern knowledge in emerging contexts of economic and political 
pluralism. This paper makes a novel attempt at establishing the extent to which 
health industry associations and umbrella organizations promote the develop-
ment of technological capabilities and effective governance of health innovation. 
Drawing on data gathered through desk-based research and fieldwork in India 
and South Africa, we argue that these associations constitute public actors that 
play key roles in the politics of innovation and development. The data further 
reveal that health industry associations and umbrella organizations clearly 
engage differently with government and related stakeholders; the former func-
tion more as an “interface” of its members or as an “extension” of the industry 
while the latter perform the role of an “intermediary.” This distinction has signifi-
cant implications not only for policymakers involved in shaping Indian and South 
African innovation policies, but also for organizations which play crucial roles 
in health innovation diffusion. Despite differences, health industry associations 
and umbrella organizations in India and South Africa not only diffuse knowledge 
to health innovation systems – i.e., downstream engagement – but also actively 
engage in an upstream relationship with the government, influencing policies 
and regulations. This relationship is often uneasy in the sense that there are con-
flicts of interests and discontinuities between associations and government.
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 provides a conceptual under-
standing of health industry associations as public actors for innovation and 
development. Section 3 presents the research methodology underpinning this 
1 See Lyall and Tait (2005); Jesperesen (2008); Lyall, Papaioannou, and Smith (2009).
2 Abuduxike and Aljunid (2012: p. 2).
3 See Mugabe (2005); Korenblit (2006); Mahoney and Morel (2006).
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paper, and Section 4 focuses on the cases of India and South Africa, discussing 
the activities of several health industry associations and umbrella organizations. 
Section 5 discusses these cases in light of the conceptual framework, and the 
paper then concludes by summarizing the main argument.
2   Understanding industry associations as public 
actors for innovation and development
Industry associations are often regarded as controversial actors in innovation 
and development. Several economists and political scientists express distrust 
in them. For instance, as early as the 18th century, Adam Smith, in The Wealth 
of Nations,4 accused associations of playing a negative role in the economy, 
conspiring against the public or raising the prices of goods. In his view, asso-
ciations were rather enemies of the emerging liberal market and the process of 
free competition. Much later, Mancur Olson argued that industry associations 
always seek unproductive rents rather than pursue the common or public inter-
est.5 His theory was based on a study of The Logic of Collective Action where 
he insisted that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, 
or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals 
act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common group interests.”6 Building on this theory, Moore and 
Hamalai (1993) warned that industry associations can even generate conflict 
and lead to a waste of resources instead of promoting entrepreneurship and 
innovation.7 The rent-seeking activities of associations and their competition 
for influencing governmental action enable them to adopt differentially advan-
tageous positions. This, in addition to conflict and waste of resources, can also 
affect the degree of democratization of a country.8 When the state and govern-
ment are penetrated by industry associations and other sectoral interest groups, 
administrative authority is required. Otherwise, policymakers might see asso-
ciations as their clients, trying to satisfy their needs rather than promoting the 
interests of the public.9
4 Smith (2003).
5 Olson (1982).
6 Olson (1965: p. 2).
7 Moore and Hamalai (1993).
8 Kimenyi (1989).
9 Atkinson and Coleman (1989).
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Despite criticism, lobbying of governments continues to be a widespread 
practice in capitalist economies.10 Industry associations are institutionalized 
forms of public action which promote the interests of business elites through 
close relations with the state. In this sense, they often create “state-society 
synergy.” According to Evans (2014), that synergy was crucial to 20th century 
industrial transformation.11 Indeed, especially in developing regions such as East 
Asia, industrial-led “economic growth has occurred in contexts where there were 
strong collaborative relations between political and economic elites.”12 Thus, it 
seems there is a possibility of growth-enhancing relations between state and 
business.13 Such a possibility has renewed research and policy interest in state-
business relations (SBR) in general and industry associations in particular. For 
instance, Calì and Sen (2011), Sen (2013) and Te Velde (2013) clearly argue that 
effective SBR not only matter for economic performance but also for efficient 
skills development, capital formation and high productivity.14 Also, Leftwich 
(2009) stresses such relations should be viewed from a historical institutionalist 
perspective, recognizing their role in achieving common goals – e.g., economic 
growth.15
Notwithstanding the focus on SBR and their impact on economic perfor-
mance, the above literature has so far overlooked the role of industry associa-
tions in technological innovation in specific sectors. Innovation can be broadly 
defined as an activity that leads to technological products and/or processes 
which are new to the market and/or new to the world. Since the 1780s, these 
products and/or services have ranged from industrial textiles, railways and elec-
tricity to medicines, automobiles, information and communication technology 
and, more recently, nanotechnology, genomics and biotechnology.16 Innova-
tion as such depends on the systemic interaction between public and private 
actors as well as the feedback mechanisms that exist between value chains and 
users.17 This is what neo-institutionalist economists such as Freeman, Lund-
vall and Nelson18 define as national systems of innovation (NSI): “The systems 
of interacting private and public firms (either large or small) universities and 
10 Bouwen (2002).
11 Evans (2014).
12 Calì and Sen (2011: p. 1542).
13 See Amsden (1989); Evans (1995); Maxfield and Schneider (1997); Doner and Schneider 
(2000); Doner, Hicken, and Ritchie (2009).
14 See Calì and Sen (2011); Sen (2013); Te Velde (2013).
15 Leftwich (2009).
16 Freeman and Soete (1997).
17 Chataway et al. (2009).
18 See Freeman (1995); Lundvall (1992); Nelson (1993).
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governance agencies, aiming at the production of science and technology within 
national borders.”19
It might be argued that industry associations are key actors of NSI. As Gran-
ovetter (1995) points out, “their activity has to do less with operations and more 
with negotiating and affecting the institutional and governance arrangements 
under which their industry proceeds.”20 Greenwood and Hinings21 indicate that 
industry associations can work closely with the state to protect their self-regulat-
ing independence and autonomy as governments not only have control over some 
resources crucial for firms’ survival, but also influence their innovative capabili-
ties through specific regulations – e.g., intellectual property rights (IPRs) and 
innovation policies.22
At the very least, within innovation systems, industry associations provide 
a forum, allowing companies to come together and collectively discuss issues 
of innovation and economic development.23 According to Foray, “collective 
action in the domain of innovation and technology is a key issue. There are a 
large number of economic opportunities for collective action – not only in some 
pre-competitive areas of scientific research but also in many highly competi-
tive markets.”24 Foray focuses on what he calls industry-specific public goods 
(ISPGs) – i.e., resources that are public and industry specific, for example, par-
ticular sets of skills, class of capital good equipment, technical services, etc. 
For him, industry associations constitute solutions to the problem of provision 
of ISPGs.
However, industry associations are socially and politically embedded actors 
with functions that go far beyond ISPGs. This is evident not only in NSI but also 
in sectoral systems of innovation (SSI) – i.e., systems of knowledge linkages 
and networks at sectoral level.25 One of such systems is health. According to 
Chataway et al. (2009):
[the] health innovation system…includes relevant aspects of macro environment of institu-
tions, pertinent rules and procedures within national systems of innovation, the activities of 
health institutions within a national health system and the micro level innovation activities of 
individual companies and organizations involved in healthcare value chain including produc-
tion, delivery, financing and research.26
19 Niosi et al. (1993: p. 212).
20 Granovetter (1995: p. 96).
21 Greenwood and Hinings (1996).
22 Halpin, Daugbjerg, and Schartzman (2011); Baines and Viney (2009); Scott (1992).
23 Nadvi (1999).
24 Foray (2003: p. 372).
25 Malerba and Orsenigo (2002); Malerba (2004).
26 Chataway et al. (2009: p. 12).
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Recent empirical work on the role of industry associations in health inno-
vation systems of developing countries suggests that they “fulfill important 
information and coordination roles…often compensating for inadequacies 
in the business environment, when faced with the need to compete in exter-
nal markets.”27 In addition to this, they develop networks and partnerships 
through which public-private collaboration for biopharmaceutical innova-
tion can be achieved. The institutional context in which many health industry 
associations operate in developing countries is one of “inefficient policies and 
regulations, as well as…weak linkages between the public and private sector. 
The latter shortcoming is largely the result of an inadequate national inno-
vation system.”28 Indeed, as Intarakumnerd and Charoenporn observe, in a 
number of developing economies, innovation systems can be characterized as 
weak and fragmented because of the high degree of such systemic failures.29 
Many industry association activities are designed to improve the functioning 
of government in terms of efficient policies and regulations. It is clear that 
industry associations play an important role in shaping government policies 
on health innovation, establishing governance institutions and strengthening 
the enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, they need to be carefully understood 
in terms of more interdisciplinary frameworks such as those of innovation 
systems30 and politics of development. The latter is particularly concerned 
with the role of politics, governance and institutions in production and diffu-
sion of new goods and services for improving the lives of people, especially in 
developing countries.31
Industry associations appear to be actively involved in the diffusion of knowl-
edge within health-innovation systems of developing countries. According to 
Abuduxike and Aljunid, “a national health-innovation system consists of such 
dynamic networks of public and private sectors, connected through nonlinear 
interactions and activities to generate specific knowledge and use it to produce 
and supply new technologies [and products] to solve health problems.”32 A coun-
try’s NSI in general and national system of health innovation (NSHI) in particular 
depend on the politics of development – i.e., the process of establishing govern-
ing structures and institutional environments within which interactions take 
27 Athreye and Chaturvedi (2007: p. 157).
28 Abuduxike and Aljunid (2012: p. 2).
29 Intarakumnerd and Charoenporn (2013).
30 See Lundvall (1992); Nelson (1993); Edquist (1997); Freeman and Soete (1997).
31 See Lucas (1997); Houtzager and Moore (2003); Williams (2004); Leftwich (2004, 2006); 
Hickey (2008); Papaioannou (2011).
32 Abuduxike and Aljunid (2012: p. 2).
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place. Such structures include stable regimes, financial system, innovation poli-
cies and research and education systems.33
Recent research suggests that in developing countries, the political creation 
of successful institutions of innovation happens only under significant pres-
sure from actors such as industry associations.34 According to Tsebelis (2002), 
industry associations constitute “veto players” which influence politics of devel-
opment and therefore governing structures of health innovation capabilities.35 
For example, concerns about health infrastructure and service improvements 
are advanced by associations through a combination of direct action and lob-
bying. India, for example, where a history of politics of development is strong,36 
has health industry associations that engage in public action towards improv-
ing institutional environments and assisting firms in strengthening technologi-
cal capabilities.37 By contrast, in South Africa where the politics of development 
is weak, health industry associations appear to engage in public action towards 
building a NSI. Yet, in both countries, the engagement of health industry associa-
tions in public action depends on whether they can serve their interests through 
institutional change.
Although innovation and governance have been traditionally treated as 
distinct activities from politics, the interdisciplinary frameworks of NSI and the 
politics of development begin to recognize that getting politics right is, if not a pre-
condition, at least a requisite of technological innovation and good governance. 
In other words, this paper attempts to re-politicize innovation and governance by 
drawing attention to the impact of lobbying on pro-innovation policymaking in 
the health sector.38
3  Research methodology
This paper is based on an empirical study of health industry associations and 
umbrella organizations in middle-income developing countries. The overall 
methodological approach here is a qualitative cross-national comparison with 
a focus on two countries: India and South Africa. India was chosen because of 
its active involvement in health innovation and its pluralist context that allows 
33 Chaturvedi (2007).
34 Doner and Schneider (2000).
35 Tsebelis (2002).
36 Abuduxike and Aljunid (2012).
37 Tsebelis (2002).
38 Williams (2004).
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strong policy input from NSI actors such as health industry associations.39 India 
also has a well-established knowledge-driven health industry40 and has fast 
become “one of the world’s largest suppliers of vital medicines and vaccines.”41
Much of India’s recent high GDP growth – an average of 6.9% for the 7-year 
period from 2000 to 2007 with a high of 9.2% between 2006 and 2007 – 42 is driven 
by technological innovations in the manufacturing of health products such as 
drugs, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, etc. Despite the 2008 financial crisis, 
this sector witnessed reasonable stability, and furthermore, global R&D flows to 
India have been sustained.43 Within the health industry, a number of companies 
within the Indian health innovation system are represented by industry specific 
associations such as the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India 
(OPPI), the Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises (ABLE) and the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Association (IPA). At the same time, umbrella organizations such 
as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian Cham-
bers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) play a crucial role in promoting health 
innovation at the national level. Finally, government agencies such as the Bio-
technology Industry Research Assistance Council (BIRAC), private consultancy 
companies such as Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC), research organizations such 
as SERUM Institute, multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Glaxo Smith 
Cline (GSK) and domestic companies such as Achira Labs constitute important 
stakeholders in the Indian health innovation system.
South Africa, on the other hand, was identified as the second empirical 
research site because of its position as a health industry fore-runner in Africa and 
its recent introduction of a NSI approach that allows interactions between differ-
ent actors, including government and industry associations. A recent National 
Biotech Survey revealed more than 106 biotechnology companies in South Africa, 
including 47 identified as “core” biotechnology firms, and more than 154 bio-
technology products and/or services with earning revenues of at least US $61 
million per year. The majority of these companies and products are in the sector 
of health.44 This is because Sub-Saharan Africa in general and South Africa in 
particular are unique in terms of requirements for health products which combat 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. South Africa’s expendi-
ture for healthcare amounts to approximately 8% of its gross domestic product 
39 Athreye and Chaturvedi (2007).
40 Abuduxike and Aljunid (2012).
41 Srinivas (2012: p. 10).
42 Krishna (2013).
43 Ibid.
44 Cloete, Nel, and Theron (2006: p. 559).
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(GDP).45 Health companies in this country are members of both industry spe-
cific and umbrella organizations. On the one hand, the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association of South Africa (PIASA) until recently represented domestic but also 
foreign MNCs. In 2009, its members supplied about 40% of the total pharmaceu-
tical market in South Africa.46 However, in April 2013 PIASA merged with Inno-
vative Medicines South Africa (IMSA), which used to represent research-based 
companies. The new association was named Innovative Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association South Africa (IPASA). Other industry specific associations within the 
South African health innovation system include the National Association of Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers (NAPM) and the South African Medical Device Indus-
try Association (SAMED). Conversely, the South African Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry (SACCI) is an umbrella organization that represents multi-sectoral 
companies, including biopharmaceuticals. Finally, government departments 
such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), public-private partnerships 
such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) but also MNCs 
such as Pfiser and domestic companies such as Litha constitute the main stake-
holders in the South Africa health innovation system.
Data for this paper were collected through both desk-based research and field-
work. The latter took the viewpoints of all three types of innovation actors men-
tioned above – i.e., industry specific associations, umbrella organizations and 
related stakeholders. From July 2011 to June 2014, relevant documents such as 
reports and web-based publications of these actors were collected. In addition, 45 
face-to-face interviews were conducted with key respondents in India and South 
Africa, which lasted 30–90 min with a mean duration of 40 min. Both the list of 
documents and the list of interviewees were identified through an initial pilot study 
of health industry associations that took place in India and South Africa. This study 
indicated innovative activities in healthcare delivery, revealing systemic interac-
tions between associations, government and other stakeholders. It also identified 
key informants to be interviewed. Building on the results of the pilot study, the 
extensive desk-based research mainly analyzed annual reports/reviews of asso-
ciations and the fieldwork focused on face-to-face interviews with high level rep-
resentatives of health industry associations, umbrella organizations and related 
stakeholders. Interview questions focused on their context and historical back-
ground, their main activities and their function as public actors of development.
Empirical data were triangulated with other sources, including government 
publications, research journal articles, consultancy reports and media releases. 
These data were analyzed in terms of our conceptual framework of innovation 
45 IMSA (2012).
46 PIASA (2009).
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system and politics of development. Methodological decisions about what 
counted as evidence of “successful” diffusion of knowledge and innovation were 
taken on the basis of three criteria: regular systemic interactions of health indus-
try associations with public and private actors (e.g., the state and governments, 
other associations, etc.); specific knowledge and innovation broker activities of 
health industry associations; development of platforms of knowledge and inno-
vation diffusion, including conferences, workshops, etc. Using these three crite-
ria, we excluded evidence which could not count as systemic and/or interactive 
enough to ensure consistency with our innovation systems framework. Tables 1–3 
present an overview of the health industry associations, the umbrella organi-
zations and the related stakeholders studied for this paper. In addition, they 
provide the number of people interviewed in each organization. The justification 
for choosing these actors and not others lies in the key role they play in the Indian 
and South African innovation systems.
4  The cases of India and South Africa
4.1  India
4.1.1  Context and historical background
Over recent decades, the growing economic and political power of India, one of 
the so-called BRICS, has attracted substantial attention.47 Researchers tend to 
investigate the drivers of India’s economic growth and its implications for global 
governance and development. However, what they often overlook is the size of 
India’s democracy – the largest in the world – and the implications it has for 
state-business relations. According to Kohli, “Indian democracy is…best under-
stood by focusing, not mainly on its socioeconomic determinants but on how 
power distribution in that society is negotiated and renegotiated.”48 A concern 
with power distribution and negotiation of interests draws attention to the role of 
industry associations in governing innovation and development through lobby-
ing of government.
To understand this role, one should go back to the early years of independ-
ence when India started bringing together inherited businesses and political 
communities experienced with liberal procedures of parliamentary democracy. 
47 Wilson and Purushothaman (2003).
48 Kohli (2001: p. 1).
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As Yadar points out, “by 1947, there were more than 1500 businesses and trade 
groups…in India.”49 This marks an important difference from the SBR of other 
developing countries. Indeed, as Kochanek also reminds us, the development of 
associations and interest groups in India “has historically drawn upon liberal 
traditions of free association and pluralism rather than European, collectivist-
public-law based corporatism.”50 The case of CII is quite characteristic here. As 
one respondent from CII said:
…we started as just a 5 company association in Calcutta…at the time British capital in Cal-
cutta formed an association of engineering companies. So that expanded with British capital 
and a lot of things came under railways…Now when Indian capital came to fore they had 
exactly the same structure as the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta.51
Table 1: Health industry associations under study.
Name of association   Year of 
establishment
  No. of 
members
  Nature of membership   No. of 
interviewees
OPPI (India)   1965  93  Dominated by MNCs   3 from OPPI
ABLE (India)   2003  270  Dominated by small 
biotech companies
  2 from ABLE
IPA (India)   1939  10,000  Dominated by Indian 
pharmacists
  1from IPA
IPASA (South Africa)   2013  24  Dominated by IP holder 
MNCs
  6 from IPASA
NAPM (South Africa)   1977  24  Dominated by South 
African generics firms
  1from NAPM
SAMED (South Africa)  1985  160  Dominated by South 
African manufacturers
  1from SAMED
Source: Table developed by authors from study data.
Table 2: Umbrella organizations under study.
Name of umbrella 
organization
  Year of 
establishment
  No. of 
members
  Nature of membership   No. of 
interviewees
CII (India)   1895   7100  Dominated by technology firms   5 from CII
FICCI (India)   1927   250,000  Dominated by multi-sector SMEs  5from FICCI
SACCI (South Africa)  2007   20,000  Dominated by multi-sector SMEs  1 from SACCI
Source: Table developed by authors from study data.
49 Yadar (2008: p. 69).
50 Kochanek (1995–1996: p. 530).
51 Interview extract: 1.
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This fundamental division between British and Indian capital as well as caste-and-
region-based social separations led to the emergence of a multiplicity of associa-
tions, representing industry in India.52 In the decades since independence, and 
especially in the 1980s and in the 1990s, the roles and strategies of these associa-
tions have changed towards becoming less individualistic and more pluralistic. 
This means that they have ceased promoting patron-client relations. Instead, 
associations have become more open to businesses and industrial sectors. This 
corresponds to an accelerated process of political, economic and social change, 
taking place in India during that time. Specifically, at the level of politics, the 
electoral loss of the Congress Party in 1989 and the emerging pattern of coali-
tion governments in the successive years have led to a competitive political envi-
ronment that promotes public policy contributions by businesses and industrial 
sectors. At the level of economy and society, the New Economic Reforms in 1991 
towards liberalization, export promotion, privatization and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) have encouraged the private industrial sector in areas such as health 
not only to innovate for achieving global competitiveness but also to collaborate 
with the government for achieving appropriate regulatory frameworks. This par-
ticular change has enabled health industry associations like OPPI to lobby the 
government in favor of policies such as strong IPRs. Given OPPI’s representation 
Table 3: Related stakeholders under study.
Government 
departments 
and agencies
  MNCs and domestic 
companies
  Consultancy 
companies 
and institutes
  Partnerships   No. of interviewees
BIRAC (India)   GSK (India)   PWC (India)   NEPAD 
(South Africa)
  2 from BIRAC; 2 
from NEPAD; 1 from 
PWC; 1 from GSK
DTI (South 
Africa)
  Strand life sciences 
(India)
  SERUM 
(India)
    1 from DTI; 1from 
SERUM; 3 from 
Strand life sciences
DST (South 
Africa)
  Achira labs (India)       1 from Achira labs; 
2 from DST
  Biocon (India)       1 from Biocon
  Pfiser (South Africa)       1 from Pfiser
  Africa bio (South Africa)      2 from Africa bio
  Litha (South Africa)       1 from Litha
  Johnson & Johnson 
(South Africa)
      1 from Johnson & 
Johnson
Source: Table developed by authors from study data.
52 Kochanek (1995–1996).
Industry associations, health innovation systems and politics      265
of research-based pharmaceuticals,53 especially MNCs, the tightening of IPRs is 
considered to be a major incentive for producing innovative drugs and therapies. 
In OPPI’s view, India can never become a “Drug Discovery and Pharma Innova-
tion Hub” unless IPRs is genuinely respected.54 Thus, one respondent from OPPI 
confirmed:
OPPI spearheaded the movement towards strong IPR laws in India. We made presentations 
to government ministers, provided evidence of its benefits and created awareness among key 
government decision makers.55
The 1990s liberalization era marked the end of India’s long dispute about TRIPS, 
including its leading role during the GATT Uruguay Round talk in efforts against 
TRIPS which it and other countries, notably Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, argued 
would hurt their domestic pharmaceutical industries and restrict their access to 
affordable medicines. India’s dropping of its opposition to TRIPS occurred with 
its signing of the Uruguay Round agreements in 1994 and its ascension to the 
WTO in 1995 which required India to reform its existing patent regime and come 
into TRIPS compliance. Based in part on its past argument against TRIPS and its 
stature as an emerging global player, India was able to negotiate a 10-year phase-
in period (until January 2005) of the full patent protection on pharmaceuticals as 
required under TRIPS.56
India’s liberalization has also enabled the emergence of new associations 
such as ABLE57 with the objective to lobby for the Indian biopharma. This health 
industry currently includes more than 300 companies with total revenue more 
than US$2.4 billion. Innovative products range from biosimilars and vaccines to 
bio-manufacturing and stem cells. As one respondent from ABLE explained:
…there were a lot of lobbies for the chemical industries … but there was none for the biotech-
nology and bio-companies.58
It should be stressed that although health industry associations welcomed the 
1990s liberalization in India, umbrella organizations such as FICCI opposed it 
fearing that increased competition from overseas would affect their members. 
53 Here it should be said that OPPI only represents research-based MNCs in India and not the 
entire pharma sector. Other associations, including the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association 
(IDMA), represent domestic pharmaceutical companies and especially generics manufacturers.
54 OPPI (2014).
55 Interview extract: 2.
56 Mueller (2007).
57 ABLE (2012).
58 Interview extract: 3.
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This led to split in opinions about the right approach towards the New Economic 
Reforms. Other pro-liberal umbrella organizations such as CII criticized FICCI. 
Thus, as one respondent from CII clearly stated:
I think CII was behind reform process from the early 1990s and that is very much credit to the 
CII, although it wasn’t true of other industry organizations. In case of CII it was the combi-
nation of membership and quality of the secretariat…CII represented progressive face of the 
industry and I regret to say that FICCI…represented regressive face of the industry.59
This statement reflects the power conflict among umbrella organizations 
with regards to influencing government policy towards an outward-looking 
strategy of industrial innovation. Power conflict is crucial for understanding 
the process through which industrial elites compete for control over policies 
which serve their interests. It also reflects the fact that Indian business and 
industrial elites are far from being a unified community. Politically, the close 
identification of FICCI with the Indian National Congress has been considered 
to be unacceptable by more liberal industrialists.60 In fact, the rise of CII is 
due to the conflict between individualistic and pluralist SBR. This conflict 
impacted Indian NSI in general and NSHI in particular. FICCI for instance has 
been preoccupied with keeping the cost of healthcare down. According to one 
respondent from FICCI:
The single greatest importance…for India is to continue to offer the best and the cheapest 
medical care for the people of India. As you already know India offers the best and the cheap-
est medical care in the world in terms of the network, the cost of pharmaceutical products, and 
[the] cost of medical devices.61
By contrast, CII has been preoccupied with fostering innovation and healthcare 
regardless of cost. According to one respondent from CII:
We now have a healthcare … team … what is called the team for knowledge initiatives. [It] 
focuses squarely on innovation whether it is in biopharma it does not matter.62
Given CII’s general focus on India’s NSI, its specific activities in the health sector 
are a small portion of what they do. However, CII fosters innovation in this sector 
by strengthening systemic linkages between key industrial and health innova-
tion actors through, for example, summits (e.g., the annual pharma/life sciences/
59 Interview extract: 4.
60 Kochanek (1995–1996).
61 Interview extract: 5.
62 Interview extract: 6.
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biotech summit). It also initiates common standards in manufacturing health 
products and brings together academia and health industry and government.63
4.1.2  The main activities of Indian associations
The activities of health industry-specific associations such as OPPI, IPA and ABLE 
are different from the activities of umbrella organizations such as CII and FICCI. 
The former act as interfaces of their members or as extensions of industry. This 
implies that they strictly represent the narrow interests of the health industry, 
and therefore, their activities range from trying to influence the government on 
health specific regulatory issues to diffusing knowledge and integrating different 
parts of the Indian NSHI. By contrast, the latter act as intermediaries between 
their members and government, meaning they do not strictly represent the 
narrow interests of one industry, and therefore, their activities range from creat-
ing framework conditions and incentives for innovation to setting up knowledge 
networks and creating innovation systems.
Specifically, in order to influence innovation policymaking, OPPI actively 
seeks representation in a number of government bodies. For example, its presi-
dent is a member of the Indian Planning Commission and has made presenta-
tions to different government departments. Upstream engagement seems to be 
an important lobbying practice for OPPI. This is because it brings the voice 
of a specific health industry to the ears of government. It is indicative that, 
only in 2013–2014, OPPI delegations met with policymakers and government 
authorities 65 times to discuss regulatory issues, ranging from clinical trials 
and quality of innovative medicines to patents and access to innovative health 
care.64
In addition to upstream engagement with government, OPPI also engages 
downstream with umbrella organizations. This is a new strategy that goes beyond 
submissions to government on issues such as IPRs. As one key respondent from 
OPPI revealed:
I said every submission will not just say what we have to say but we will go and play an active 
role in all national chambers. So India has three national chambers: CII, FICCI and ASSO-
CHAM. I am co-chair of the ASSOCHAM committee on IPRs, I am co-chair at one of the sub-
committees on IPRs at FICCI…65
63 Herstatt, Tiwari, and Ernst (2008).
64 OPPI (2014).
65 Interview extract: 7.
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This active engagement of OPPI downstream implies that power conflicts between 
associations often coexist with coalitions aimed at putting collective pressure to 
government for regulatory changes in favor of biopharmaceutical and clinical 
research companies. Let us take for example the area of clinical trials. OPPI works 
closely with several industry associations, including IPA, CII and FICCI, to press 
for clear criteria on grant waivers of Phase III clinical trials. Also this downstream 
engagement is intended to strengthen the regulatory position of association indi-
rectly through negotiations of IPRs at multi-actor forums. Such forums include 
MNCs, generics companies, law firms, patent agents and NGOs.
It might be argued that all these public and private actors constitute India’s 
NSHI. Health industry associations integrate industrial and social parts of that 
system as well as knowledge. The latter is diffused through collaboration and 
events such as conferences and meetings. As one respondent from OPPI said:
Collaboration is anyway happening…we are talking to IPA, the Indian Pharmaceutical Alli-
ance, IDMA…of course meetings and conferences are [platforms] which we jointly do…on 
ethics for example we did last month, with European experts coming and we invited Indian 
companies…and others participated.66
One factor influencing integration is the mobility of elites and health experts 
from academia to industry and then to government and to associations. As one 
respondent from an MNC stressed, the need for mobility is crucial:
You have to have people who move around, who are part of industry bodies, academic, govern-
ment and I think their perspectives are very important.67
Another factor influencing integration is the role of industry associations as 
brokers of public-private collaboration. For instance, associations such as ABLE 
and IPA act as brokers of collaboration between venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs and policymakers. According to one key respondent from ABLE:
Part of what ABLE did from its very early days was to organize what we call the Bioinvest con-
ference where we actually bring investors and entrepreneurs together and public policy people 
and we typically organize these in Mumbai because that’s where the investor company is.68
India is a country with limited venture capital for start-ups in areas such as health 
related biotechnology. Therefore, the role of industry specific associations also 
66 Interview extract: 8.
67 Interview extract: 9.
68 Interview extract: 10.
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improves the funding conditions for new biotechnology firms. This is something 
that the traditional NSI approach to developing countries has ignored.69 Spe-
cifically, it has ignored that in countries such as India, ABLE and other health 
industry associations fill in the gap of funding for early stages innovation by cre-
ating a pool of private equity or by bringing in the government.70 The latter oper-
ates through public agencies such as BIRAC. As one key respondent from BIRAC 
confirmed:
[Regarding] early funding, there is quite a lot…through BIRAC.71
ABLE advises BIRAC on issues of funding for new technology start-ups, aiming 
to encourage more risk capital accumulation in India. Additionally, it organizes 
joint workshops on “Enterprise Building & Innovation” in to help biotech start-
ups and SMEs building innovative capabilities. Certainly, the strategy of encour-
aging more risk capital accumulation for innovative start-ups has not been always 
successful. According to another respondent:
…the government has been willing to put more capital … but the government wants to manage 
it and then it’s very difficult to take calculated risks because the auditors and the financial 
guidelines from government are much more conservative ….72
In this stage, the role of specific industry associations such as ABLE is clear: they 
influence health innovation by proposing to the government different models of 
funding new technology start-ups. Our data confirms that, indeed “A well-organ-
ized private sector can make clear to the state where the priorities are for public 
investment and can monitor the quality of such investment.”73 However, the identi-
fication of funding priorities for new technology start-ups is distinct from the activi-
ties of umbrella organizations such as CII and FICCI. As one respondent put it:
ABLE was caring much more for young biotech companies and agencies like CII and FICCI 
have a little bit of bias towards the biggies….74
Indeed it might be argued that umbrella organizations are concerned with 
broader industrial policy issues, and their aim is to influence the framework 
69 Watkins et al. (2014).
70 BioSpectrum (2013).
71 Interview extract: 11.
72 Interview extract: 12.
73 Kathuria, Raj, and Sen (2013: p. 88).
74 Interview extract: 13.
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conditions within which innovation takes place. As one respondent from a con-
sultancy company pointed out:
CII and FICCI usually concentrate on big ticket policy items that are very high profile in 
nature, they closely connected with government, so they tend to hold annual summits with 
the government, policymakers and stakeholders both foreign and domestic and try to move 
the agenda on the key issues of the day: bureaucracy, regulatory, tax, strategy, basic industry 
issues.75
It might be said that umbrella organizations in India have much more proactive 
and partnership approach to government than health industry specific associa-
tions. In fact, the latter have strongly reacted to government policies which failed 
to serve the narrow interests of their members. Since 2010, OPPI has released 
in the press hundreds of statements against government policies such as com-
pulsory licensing, drug pricing, etc.76 By contrast the former have co-operated 
with government in formulating and implementing some of these policies. The 
umbrella associations’ partnership approach is increasingly evidence based. As a 
key respondent from FICCI stressed:
They [umbrella organizations] started as lobby groups, plain and simple lobby groups. That 
continues in a semi-structured manner with…both awareness and evidence based, let us say 
advocacy so it is not pure lobbying any more. There is a lot of research that actually happens 
behind the original proposal of lobbying. That is a direct interface into the whole policy debate 
because there is fair amount of policy, resurgent policy debate.77
This statement confirms the gradual involvement of umbrella organizations in 
India’s governance of innovation. Such organizations have strong research teams 
and experts who collect data about their members’ activities, including R&D and 
commercialization of new products. In addition, they employ consultancy firms 
to provide data and analyses of trends in particular sectors such as health. As one 
respondent from CII revealed:
We have published a booklet which we are going to different ministries with…trying to say 
to them [to] look at it from this level or that level…Also we are trying to make a 100 days 
program for the government in aid of biotechnology, pharma, healthcare, life science, inno-
vation…we will apply to government soon and say this is our 100 days program, this is our 
wish list and what can you do? Then they may call a meeting and that is the interaction that 
goes on.78
75 Interview extract: 14.
76 OPPI (2013).
77 Interview extract: 15.
78 Interview extract: 16.
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This statement confirms Kochanek’s early research finding that the success of 
umbrella organizations such as CII is due to the development of a close working 
relationship with key bureaucrats and an emphasis on common interests in eco-
nomic development.79
4.1.3  Indian associations as public actors of development
Our data suggests that despite the importance of both health industry associa-
tions and umbrella organizations in India’s NSHI, only the latter can be consid-
ered to be public actors of development. This is because umbrella organizations 
such as FICCI and CII have clear developmental objectives. According to one 
respondent from FICCI:
…the private sector is moving into the development space. The development space used to 
be purely a government run socialist concept... But I think now it is more or less obvious that 
industry bodies are also one more player in the development space.80
Indeed umbrella organizations in India work closely with NGOs and international 
development agencies to promote innovation led growth and poverty reduction. 
For example, FICCI is part of the Millennium Alliance that aims at encouraging 
and scaling up innovations for development.81 In the area of health, such inno-
vations include: 3nethra – an integrated pre-screening ophthalmology device (a 
single portable pre-screening device that detects cataract, glaucoma and other 
problems) – and caremother – a mobile pregnancy care (a portable kit, mobile 
and web applications for high risk pregnancy identification, recording data and 
providing medical tests).82 As one respondent from FICCI explained:
…this initiative started in 2011 and USAID had certain sectors in mind, basic education, medi-
cine and child health, clean energy, water sanitation, so these are the focus areas … the Indian 
government graciously agreed to part with $5 million … and so USAID is contributing $7.7 
million … we have a corpus now to which we give grants …83.
In contrast to umbrella organizations in India, health industry associations 
cannot be considered as public actors of development. Our data suggests despite 
the fact that they are key actors of the country’s innovation system, they do not 
79 Kochanek (1995–1996).
80 Interview extract: 17.
81 FICCI (2013).
82 FICCI and USAID (2014).
83 Interview extract: 18.
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have common interest in development. As one respondent from a consultancy 
firm pointed out:
[Health industry associations] succeed to create enough noise for the government to take 
notice of what they are doing … The noise does impact the debate but may not steer it in [one] 
direction because of competing associations ….84
In any case, our data clearly indicates that both umbrella organizations and 
health industry specific associations are important not only for the Indian inno-
vation system but also for the political system. As one respondent put it:
… all of them are very useful, they all have some roles to play …the input of industry associa-
tions is hugely valued by the bureaucrats … because for them at consensus time democracy 
works best when pieces of paper are given by the industry associations as opposed to a single 
large company.85
Indeed, industry associations and umbrella organizations in India are part of the 
country’s liberal pluralism. The latter lies behind a particular politics of devel-
opment – i.e., the politics of bargaining and negotiation in areas such as health 
innovation. According to Manor (2001), the capacity to practice such politics pre-
vents different economic interests and socio-cultural heterogeneities from creat-
ing political chaos.
4.2  South Africa
4.2.1  Context and historical background
South Africa, also one of the BRICS, made the transition from an apartheid state to 
a constitutional democratic state in 1994 and since then, has experienced excep-
tional economic growth but also increased inequality and extreme poverty in 
certain sections of the population. One key element of the South African politics 
of development is the relationship between state and civil society. This relation-
ship is characterized by vibrant interest groups and industry associations making 
claims on the state about two main issues: first, capability expansion through 
co-production of goods and services, and second, increased share of resource rev-
enues for investment in innovation and development.86
84 Interview extract: 19.
85 Interview extract: 20.
86 Evans (2014); Heller (2011); Arrighi, Aschoff, and Scully (2010).
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To understand the role of industry associations in South Africa, it is impor-
tant to examine the early years of its transition to a democracy when the country 
moved towards a more pluralist approach to politics than corporatist. According 
to Lehman, “evidence strongly suggests that democratization…in South Africa 
since 1994, has weakened the corporatist hold of the state and has strengthened 
and expanded civil society.”87 Corporatism is a concept associated with authori-
tarian regimes such as the apartheid state and describes a system of interest rep-
resentation based on non-competing associations supervised and controlled by 
the state itself.88 In contrast, neo-liberal pluralism describes a competitive market 
system of associations which form part of civil society – i.e., the realm in which 
members of society voluntarily create autonomous groups to advance their values 
and interests.89 As Lehman points out, “the evolution of interest groups in South 
Africa has been interlined with neo-liberal economic policies, expansion of civil 
society and uneasy relationship with the state.”90
Indeed, this is clearly reflected in the case of two health industry specific 
associations: Pharmaceutical Industry Association of South Africa (PIASA) 
and Innovative Medicines South Africa (IMSA). As has been mentioned, in 
April 2013 these associations merged to form the Innovative Pharmaceutical 
Industry Association South Africa (IPASA), which currently represents MNCs 
that conduct their own R&D and excludes domestic pharmaceutical companies 
that have no Intellectual Property. Although the vision of IPASA appears to be 
better access to healthcare, the association is in uneasy negotiation with gov-
ernment over the latter’s policy plan to change the rules for medicine patents, 
which incorporates patent flexibilities91 after the Doha Declaration92 and rec-
ommends elimination of weak patents, promoting the production of generic 
drugs.93 In response, IPASA appears to have embarked on an international 
campaign against full implementation of the government plan, lobbying for 
stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) regime on innovative medicines. Its 
main objection is that, by using TRIPS flexibilities and by promoting generics, 
the South African government’s plan on IP policy will reduce innovation and 
fail to attract FDI into knowledge-based firms such as biopharmaceuticals.94 As 
one respondent from IPASA put it:
87 Lehman (2008: p. 116).
88 Nyang’oro (1986).
89 Fioramonti (2005).
90 Lehman (2008: p. 118).
91 Correa and Matthews (2011).
92 WTO (2001).
93 DTI (2013).
94 IPASA (2013).
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We currently have an environment where there is … adequate respect for intellectual property 
rights. There is a policy on the table that proposes to change that. The policy itself is not clear 
enough to our minds, on where it’s going or how it’s going to be implemented … There is a lot 
of misinformation going out there ….95
In response to IPASA, the South African government insists that its policy plan is 
clearly not about weakening the TRIPS regime and the country’s NSHI but about 
implementing TRIPS with all the necessary flexibilities for the sake of public 
good.96 According to one policy maker from the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI):
… the research industry overreacted …[and] … created unnecessary tension ….97
But this tension mainly takes place between the Department of Health (DoH) and 
IPASA. Other government departments such as the DTI appear to be more sympa-
thetic towards IPASA, trying to play the role of mediator between government and 
industry. For example as another policy maker from the DTI made clear:
… the battle between government and big pharma is led by the health minister, not the DTI, so 
we try to mediate in one way, DTI is caught in the middle.98
Although the tension between IPASA and government has not been resolved yet, 
it is important to point out that the uneasy relationship between health indus-
try associations and government in South Africa has historical roots and goes 
back to the “Big Pharma vs Nelson Mandela” case in 1998.99 Reacting against a 
new law that the Mandela government unveiled that would allow the country to 
import generic and cheap drugs to deal with health emergencies such as the HIV/
AIDS crisis, the Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association (PMA) and 39 MNCs 
filed a legal challenge against the government. While PMA agreed to drop their 
lawsuit after facing substantial international and domestic opposition in 2001, 
the trust between government and health industry associations had been already 
damaged. As one respondent from an MNC pointed out:
… pre-1994 I think the industry was more in an advisory role, although perhaps not with lob-
bying focus, access to government ministries was quite possible. What changed it completely 
for the industry was the court case of 1998–2004 which was all about weakening intellectual 
95 Interview extract: 21.
96 The Economist, 27 January 2014, “The New Drug War Continued.”
97 Interview extract: 22.
98 Interview extract: 23.
99 The Guardian, 18 April 2001, “Firms Split Over Deal in Cheap Drugs Lawsuit.”
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property and so created a sense that we [the industry] were against the government. So from 
that time onward, whenever you went into the halls of government, they [the government] 
would see you as ‘you are that industry that took us to court’; so that created such animosity 
between the department of health, the relationship has never really been constructive.100
This statement confirms that, in South Africa, state business relations (SBR) 
in the area of health innovation are fragile and therefore, lack the essential 
characteristics of effectiveness. According to Calì and Sen such characteristics 
include:
(i) transparency: whether there is a flow of accurate and reliable information, both ways, 
between business and government, and from representatives of business to their own 
members; (ii) reciprocity: whether there is capacity and autonomy of state actions to 
secure improved performance in return for subsidies; (iii) credibility: whether the state 
command credibility of the private sector, and whether capitalists are able to believe what 
state actors say; and (iv) whether there is mutual trust between the state and the business 
sector…101
Clearly, South African SBR in the area of health innovation is neither transpar-
ent and reciprocal nor credible and mutually trusted. This ineffective SBR seems 
to deeply concern several MNCs in South Africa as a result of their progressive 
inability to influence the government. Instead, other civil society groups have 
entered the pluralist arena, becoming successful in shifting the focus of policy 
and practice away from innovative drug patents and towards expanding the 
import of cheap drugs from other markets such as India. Therefore, MNCs argue 
that biopharmaceutical innovation in South Africa is being undermined. Accord-
ing to one respondent from an MNC:
The big drive now which is happening, which is actually very concerning, you can see now our 
[industry] lobbying efforts have been very ineffectual and the winners in lobbying have been 
the activists.102
Although this statement cannot be fully triangulated, it reveals the strong compe-
tition between health industry specific associations and other civil society actors 
for influencing the values and direction of health innovation in South Africa. It 
also confirms the emerging neo-liberal pluralism in the country that is highly 
competitive and eventually leads to winners and losers of power over influencing 
regulation and governance of health innovation.
100 Interview extract: 24.
101 Calì and Sen (2011: p. 1543).
102 Interview extract: 25.
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4.2.2  Main activities of South African associations
Like in the case of India, health industry associations in South Africa such as 
IPASA and the National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (NAPM) 
pursue different activities from umbrella organizations such as the South African 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (SACCI). The former are extensions of indus-
try and tend to focus on regulatory issues concerning pricing policy, marketing 
guidelines and drug registration; dealing with these issues serves the narrow 
interests of their members. By contrast, the latter are intermediaries and thus 
tend to focus on wider innovation issues and legislation; addressing such wider 
issues serves the broad interests of different industrial sectors.
Specifically, in order to influence government policy, IPASA collaborates with 
NAPM and other actors of health innovation, advancing demands for reduction 
of regulatory timelines, advising on pricing factors and pressing for better frame-
work conditions of innovation. As a key respondent from IPASA confirmed:
… there is a lot of collaboration in industry; we have IPASA, we have NAPM … which is mainly 
generic … we have SAMED … and there is PHARMISA which is the South African companies. 
We collaborate with them on a thing called the PTG, which deals more with pricing of medi-
cines policy … we co-operate with them on regulatory issues ….103
Comparing to India, it seems the trend in South Africa is more downstream than 
upstream engagement. This can be explained by the fragile SBR in the area of 
health innovation. By engaging downstream, health industry specific associa-
tions appear to have a better chance to form a strong coalition vis-à-vis govern-
ment policy. This does not necessarily imply lack of upstream engagement. On 
the contrary, as another respondent from IPASA stressed:
With government we’ve got three key departments: health, trade and industry, and science 
and technology. We will watch their policy-making process, we will engage with them at Parlia-
mentary level … so if there is a policy issue we will request an opportunity to present out posi-
tion to the Portfolio Committee who will discuss it. We have reasonable access to the chairs of 
those committees on a lot of issues … we are the gatekeepers, we will say ‘whoops here comes 
the government gazette, this is how we understand its impact, come sit.104
Certainly, one of the problems in upstream engagement is the fragmentation 
between government departments. Our data suggest that the Departments of 
Health (DoH), Trade and Industry (DTI) and Science and Technology (DST) have 
103 Interview extract: 26.
104 Interview extract: 27.
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different approaches to health innovation. For example, the DoH is more hostile 
towards patents of innovative medicines and vaccines than the other depart-
ments such as DST. Therefore, the South African IP policy remains unclear. As 
one respondent from DTI said:
On the one hand the head of [health] department believes that patents are a major obstacle to 
access of modern drugs. On the other hand you have the industry which is quite in trouble; the 
research based industry is out of 1 trillion dollar market ….105
This statement indicates that DTI takes on board the health industry’s concerns 
about IP, especially that of incentivizing investment in innovative medicines (e.g., 
a new family of anti-inflammatory drugs). One reason might be that members 
of the department maintain close contact with associations such as IPASA and 
NAPM. As another respondent from DTI stressed:
… [members of DTI attend events organized by industry associations] – for example, two 
weeks ago I attended a conference with all medical schemes and insurers, it is interface 
between medical insurance clusters, so we are invited, we attend ….106
Despite this close relationship, DTI also interacts with individual companies. As 
the same respondent from DTI revealed:
…in most cases due to sensitivities such as new products and investment, I would say that 
more often we deal with individual companies.107
Our data suggest that the reason why policymakers often prefer to interact with 
individual companies is because of the strong competition among health indus-
try associations. Such competition prevents them from speaking with one voice 
to the government.
The problem of fragmentation is less obvious in the relations between gov-
ernment and umbrella associations. Like in India, umbrella associations in South 
Africa are concerned with broader innovation policy issues that affect many dif-
ferent industrial sectors. According to a key respondent from SACCI:
The process is that in South Africa the constitution and judicial fair process requires that 
stakeholders are presented with the opportunity to comment on new legislation and policy, 
usually it is a period of 30 days. So we would provide a fair comment, send it to our members, 
get mandate and send it to government.108
105 Interview extract: 28.
106 Interview extract: 29.
107 Interview extract: 30.
108 Interview extract: 31.
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The South African constitution enables umbrella organizations such as SACCI to 
work in partnership with the government on some innovation policy measures. 
This is not the case with health industry specific associations such as IPASA. The 
latter appears to be more reactive to the government while the former appears to 
be more proactive. As one respondent from SACCI admits:
…we do have a very good relationship with government, all things considered. We regularly 
house cabinet members at our breakfast events and this provides an opportunity for our 
members to first-hand meet the minister and I think it’s also a good thing to be able to see the 
person….109
This statement confirms the high level of interaction between umbrella associa-
tions and the South African government. For SACCI in particular, interaction is 
the guiding principle of its main activities. Like in the case of India, this interac-
tion is evidence based – i.e., umbrella associations such as SACCI provide evi-
dence and information to the government for certain types of health innovation 
policy. As one respondent from DTI said:
For example, when it comes to National Health Insurance they provide information on the 
health and economic outcomes, the pros and cons. The National Health Insurance is impor-
tant for them, the reason being that it could reduce the role of research based companies 
in the pharmaceutical sector; the government will be buying generics rather than innovative 
products ….110
But interaction also takes place between umbrella organizations and health 
industry specific associations and corporate groups. This is because collective 
action appears to be more successful with the engagement of different actors of 
the NSHI. One respondent from SACCI describes this downstream engagement as 
follows:
… we are fortunate that we can engage directly with high-level senior members of those cor-
porates but we also obviously engage with IPASA, we’ve had meetings together … in terms of 
lobbying what we have realized is that it’s good to have an industry body but it also adds wait 
to an argument if a corporate is there ….111
Through these multiple interactions, knowledge and information are diffused to 
South Africa’s NSHI. Key actors of the system such as biopharmaceutical compa-
109 Interview extract: 32.
110 Interview extract: 33.
111 Interview extract: 34.
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nies use these knowledge and information for improving their innovative capa-
bilities. According to one respondent from a company:
If you are not part of association you miss out a lot of information.112
4.2.3  South African associations as public actors of development
Our data suggests that, despite the crucial role both health industry and 
umbrella associations play in South Africa’s NSHI, only the latter can be con-
sidered to be public actors of development. This is for the same reasons dis-
cussed in the case of India. Umbrella associations in South Africa such as SACCI 
have broad development objectives that tend to go beyond innovation, whereas 
health industry specific associations such as IPAS, have very narrow objectives 
that tend to focus on interests of their member companies. As one respondent 
from SACCI put it:
I think the subtext to every single comment we make to government is about job creation and 
economic growth. So we are not a developmental financial institution, we do not give money … 
but we try to steer policy towards a trend that is more conducive to economic growth.113
Although there is no evidence that umbrella organizations in South Africa work 
closely with NGOs to promote development, it is clear that these associations are 
concerned with improving framework conditions for both innovation and devel-
opment. For example SACCI focuses on the illicit market for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts suggesting specific policies and regulations:
South Africa does have very large illicit market for these products because it’s a developing 
economy, it’s got links with organized crime, it’s really scary. So over-taxing or over-regulating 
these industries is not going to increase consumption, it’s going to make it more dangerous to 
consume because there are going to be more illicit products.114
SACCI’s specific policy suggestions and regulations aim at putting in place better 
market institutions and reducing the interventionist role of government. This 
implies neo-liberal politics of development that is consistent with the country’s 
emerging pluralism.
112 Interview extract: 35.
113 Interview extract: 36.
114 Interview extract: 37.
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5  Discussion
5.1  Emerging pluralism
Our case studies suggest that, in both India and South Africa, health industry 
associations are formed as public actors, which, on the one hand, provide their 
members with industry-specific public goods (ISPGs) and on the other, influence 
health innovation and the politics of development. To do so, these associations 
develop a range of capabilities, including representation in government, inter-
national co-operation, intermediation, knowledge diffusion, policy involvement 
and collaboration. If health industry associations did not exist, there would be no 
collective action of pharmaceutical companies and related stakeholders to chal-
lenge and/or improve government regulations for health innovation. A strong 
national system of health innovation (NHSI) presupposes interaction and col-
laboration between public and private actors. Health industry associations can 
effectively play the role of intermediaries, bringing these different actors together 
and diffusing knowledge and innovation.
The economic and political context within which the activities of health 
industry associations take place seems to be that of “emerging pluralism” – a 
dynamic context of bargaining between competing (public and private) interests 
and values.115 In the case of India, such context is the result of historical evolu-
tion of liberal procedures of the parliamentary democracy. Despite the fact that 
the state remains a strong authority, it allows a democratic process based on 
the interaction of competing associations and interest groups.116 In the case of 
South Africa, emerging pluralism is the result of the evolution of democratiza-
tion that was tied to economic and political liberalization.117 Competing interests 
and values are advocated by associations of civil society.118 These public actors 
exercise power over the politics of development and systems of innovation in 
developing countries. The degree of such power seems to depend on the degree 
of democratic accountability of political systems and innovation frameworks. As 
Mahoney points out, policymakers that are accountable to the public appear to 
be more responsive to associations than policymakers that are not accountable.119
It might be argued that in both India and South Africa accountability and plural-
ism historically emerged in the 1990s. In India, the economic and political reforms 
115 Dahl (1989).
116 Muñiz-Fraticelli (2014).
117 Leftwich (2006).
118 White (1993).
119 Mahoney (2007).
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which took place in that decade created the space for health industry associations 
and other civil society organizations to negotiate power and lobby governments for 
pro-innovation regulation and governance.120 To put it another way, pressure was 
put on the government for innovation friendly institutional reforms. Although it 
is true that the Indian democracy has never been insulated from associations and 
interest groups, it is also true that these public actors have become more influential 
on the country’s innovation system since liberalization. As Basile and Harris-White 
point out, “the era of liberalization in India is not only an opening up of certain 
sectors of the industrial economy, it is also a moment at which the advancement 
of interests is greatly intensified.”121 One critique of this emerging liberal politics is 
that it leads India towards a chaotic process of industrial policy. Various business 
interests compete for influencing the political process. The result of competition is 
that certain power dynamics take place in certain periods of time. For example, our 
data suggest that in order for specific policy reforms to go ahead, there is a need for 
a politician or bureaucrat to get behind them.
Similarly, in South Africa, since the transition from apartheid to a demo-
cratic state, a new economic and political space has been created for negotia-
tion and governance of innovation but also for co-operation between industries 
and government. SBR appear to be crucial for developing and implementing the 
South African innovation system, increasing innovative capabilities in biophar-
maceuticals. Public action is always purposive collective action.122 Therefore, 
health industry associations in India and South Africa have a clear purpose of 
serving the diverse needs of their members. Appropriate regulatory environment 
and knowledge diffusion are two of these needs. In order to satisfy them, our 
evidence shows that health industry associations and umbrella organizations not 
only offer consultancy services and training in a number of knowledge and inno-
vation related areas but also engage in government processes of regulation. These 
collective activities are crucial for developing firms’ dynamic capabilities and for 
helping them to co-ordinate changes in their challenging environment.123
5.2  Upstream engagement
Our data confirm that, despite their different focus, health industry associa-
tions in the developmental contexts of India and South Africa play dual insti-
120 Corbridge (2009).
121 Basile and Harris-White (2000: p. 11).
122 Mackintosh (1992).
123 Teece and Pisano (1994).
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tutional roles. On the one hand, they engage upstream to lobby their respective 
governments for provision of ISPGs and regulatory issues such as IPRs. They do 
so through their direct participation in government committees and forums for 
innovation policy. The aim is for health industry associations to get their views 
on the policy agenda, influencing the executive part of government.124 Indeed, as 
Cavazos and Szyliowicz confirm,
“Associations will often work to set the agenda while simultaneously aiming to build aware-
ness, influence policymakers and gain favorable legal decisions. They will finally strive to 
ensure that their successes are not dissipated in the implementation stage and that favorable 
state policy is enforced and effectively implemented. In this sense, associations can act as 
regulatory agents in that they seek to use the power of the state through legal activity.”125
In developmental contexts, such activities appear to strengthen institutional 
development and positively affect industry conditions. The threat industry asso-
ciations are confronted with seems to be the lack of institutions and framework 
conditions for new knowledge development and health innovation (e.g., regula-
tory delays in the registration of new medicines).
On the other hand, umbrella organizations in developmental contexts con-
stitute policy instruments of governments. This goes beyond corporatism and 
towards co-regulation or joined-up governance.126 For instance, as our case 
studies suggest, CII, FICCI and SACCI develop partnerships and co-regulate with 
governments, ensuring that their members would implement policies. Imple-
mentation of co-regulated policies and practices is a membership condition for 
some pharmaceutical associations in developing countries, and therefore, gov-
ernments do not need to spend more resources in order to enforce implemen-
tation. Health industry associations and umbrella organizations also provide 
policy input to governments for negotiating international agreements such as 
TRIPS.127
5.3  Downstream engagement
Health industry associations and umbrella organizations not only engage 
upstream, working closely with the state and governments to promote specific 
regulations and provision of ISPGs, but also engage downstream, developing 
124 Nelson (2000).
125 Cavazos and Szyliowicz (2011: p. 476).
126 Cawson (1982).
127 Athreye and Chaturvedi (2007).
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partnerships and/or coalitions with other associations and businesses for the 
achievement of common objectives. According to Cavazos and Szyliowicz,
Coalition building is particularly effective in many settings since it is characterized by strat-
egies that expand association resources and capabilities by finding interest groups with 
common perspectives on an issue that concerns the industry…the more powerful the coalition 
the more effective lobbying efforts are likely to be.128
Especially in South Africa but also in India, our data suggest that such coalitions 
are strong, indicating common perspectives across different industrial sectors. 
Umbrella organizations, such as CII, work together with OPPI to improve the 
framework conditions for knowledge diffusion and technological innovation.
Coalitions and partnerships transcend national borders – i.e., health indus-
try associations of developing countries increasingly develop coalitions with 
health industry associations and other lobbying groups of developed countries 
but also global public actors like the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA). These coalitions not only put pressure 
on global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) with regards 
to global health governance but also to diffuse knowledge of global governance 
and provide platforms for domesticating good practices of manufacturing and 
distributing drugs. Learning from global experience appears to be a key benefit of 
the involvement of Indian and South African associations with IFPMA.
6  Conclusion
This paper has sought to examine for the first time the role of health industry 
associations and umbrella organizations in health innovation and the politics 
of development, focusing specifically on India and South Africa. The argument 
has been that such associations constitute public actors which not only diffuse 
knowledge to innovation systems but also engage upstream in uneasy relation-
ships with governments and downstream in coalitions with other associations. 
Health industry associations and umbrella organizations in India and South 
African operate in an economic and political context of emerging pluralism, 
which not only enables them to collaborate for advancing common claims to gov-
ernment but also for becoming government partners for innovation and develop-
ment. This dual role of health industry associations and umbrella organizations 
makes them less neutral politically but more effective institutionally. Given that 
128 Cavazos and Szyliowicz (2011: p. 475).
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innovation and development institutions in India and South Africa are often 
weak and/or fragmented, market processes and government interventions are 
not always sufficient to resolve these problems. In a number of respects, indus-
try associations and the government co-develop policies and regulations which 
impact health innovation. Therefore, their innovative and political role should be 
seriously taken into account in the healthcare sector. Certainly, further research 
is needed to unpack the precise power relations and the rent seeking dynamics 
which influence the upstream and downstream engagements of industry associa-
tions in developing countries. Our empirical study has only indicated the uneasi-
ness of such engagements. Future research ought to go beyond that and towards 
determining sources and uses of collective power within innovation systems of 
emerging pluralist countries.
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